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BOOK REVIEWS

LEADING, BUT WHITHER?
Small Boats and Daring Men: Maritime Raiding, Irregular Warfare, and the Early American Navy,
by Benjamin Armstrong. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 2019. 280 pages. $34.95.

Naval warfare long has been classified
into two broad schools. One approach,
resting largely on the works of Alfred
Thayer Mahan, has been classified as
the “blue water,” or guerre d’escadre,
school, and focuses on open-ocean
battle-fleet operations. The competing
theory emphasizes guerre de course, or
attacks on enemy commerce, and the use
of what today would be termed asymmetric warfare at sea. Both terms were
a product of the Jeune École, a group
of French writers in the late nineteenth
century who applied land-warfare
theories to operations at sea. These
theorists concluded that technological
advances had made fleet engagements
less relevant. Commander Benjamin
Armstrong, a permanent military
professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, has
offered a new approach to examining
naval warfare by exploring an older and
often-neglected aspect of maritime conflict, guerre de razzia, or war by raiding.
Armstrong draws the idea of guerre
de razzia from a 2003 essay by noted
naval historian James Bradford. The
term guerre de razzia is French and
derives from the “colonial school” of
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land warfare advocated by Marshals
Bugeaud, Gallieni, and Lyautey. Bradford
laid the groundwork for navalizing
this concept by examining the impact
of operations conducted by John Paul
Jones during the American War of
Independence. Armstrong has expanded
both the breadth of historical examples
supporting the idea and the scope of
what might constitute guerre de razzia.
Small Boats and Daring Men proceeds
from the original premise of the
Bradford essay, that naval warfare
encompasses more than the dichotomy
of the fleet action versus guerre de
course orthodoxy. Whereas Bradford
confined his definition to the temporary
landing of forces on enemy shores,
Armstrong adds an array of activities,
each explored through a separate case
study. A different conflict or unique
theater of specific conflicts serves as
the vehicle to explore each aspect of
this new school of naval strategy. The
common thread running through these
cases is the emphasis on what would
be termed today irregular warfare.
Armstrong addresses a range of naval
missions that were common during
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the age of sail. Descents on enemy
coasts were common practice in the
era. “Cutting out” expeditions designed
to capture, or in some cases recapture,
vessels in enemy hands also were typical.
Armstrong adds some unique wrinkles
to these regular features of warfare in
the age of sail. In particular, one chapter
deals not with the projection of power
from naval vessels against objectives
ashore or close inshore, but rather the
reverse. He focuses on methods using
innovative technology against a superior
blockading force to allow a weaker
maritime power to deter invaders.
This chapter strikes a somewhat
dissonant note, but the broader themes
resonate in it as well. It also focuses
attention on a significant subtheme—
specifically, the role of equipment
and technological innovation.
Armstrong weaves two additional
themes throughout his work: the focus
on unique skill sets in addition to
specialized equipment, and the importance of upper-level leadership. Many
senior leaders saw these operations,
to use modern terminology, as lesser
included operations that were inherent
in the normal conduct of naval warfare;
such opinions were not well-founded.
Further, Armstrong emphasizes
intersectional leadership, both at the
senior level, where empowering junior
officers was essential, and at the juniorofficer level, where the mission-critical
decisions were made. These operations
served as a nursery for future successful leaders of the U.S. Navy.
If there is a weakness in this volume, it is
the absence of maps. The book provides
only a single, global chart with general
locations corresponding to the various
chapters. As most of the narrative is tactical, more and detailed maps depicting
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the individual operations would have
been useful for readers unfamiliar
with the geography of these events.
Perhaps the strongest part of the book
is the conclusion, which serves to
acknowledge that this work is a brief
survey of an understudied aspect of
America’s naval heritage. While Geoffrey
Till described naval irregular warfare as
“postmodern,” Armstrong raises the idea
that ideas perceived as new and innovative often are reinventions of ideas from
the past. As Harry Truman was reported
to have said, “The only thing new in this
world is the history you don’t know.”
Professor Armstrong offers a unique
view of the early American navy. For
the casual reader, it is an engaging series
of stories. While histories generally are
filled with the great battles, the actions
covered in this book represent smaller,
more frequent applications of naval
power. For specialists, this is a framework and an important call to study
events that do not fit neatly into the
acknowledged schools of naval strategy.
K. J. DELAMER

Our Man: Richard Holbrooke and the End of the
American Century, by George Packer. New York:
Knopf, 2019. 608 pages. $30.

The field of diplomatic history lends
itself to biographies of diplomats such as
Secretaries of State or other high-level
officials as a means of understanding
policies and the policy makers. Going
through the shelves of our university
library, one can chart the history of
American twentieth-century foreign
policy through the biographies on the
shelves. These books, along with works
such as The Best and the Brightest, tell
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